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Innovation has been really become a buzzword in recent decades both in the scientific and the political community. It is re-
garded as a primary driver of social and economic development. However, the EU’s innovation performance hasn’t improved 
significantly in the past 15 years, despite the remarkable political effort to boost it. In this paper, by a thorough analysis of 
the most relevant EU policy documents from 1995 to 2014, the authors examined the evolution of the European innova-
tion policies and compared it with the evolution of innovation studies. They found that just as Europe is lagging behind its 
most important competitors in terms of economic performance, so does the innovation policy lag behind the current state 
of the art of innovation research. This poses significant problems if we are to fully exploit the social and economic potential 
of innovation activities. They argue that a broader operational concept of innovation could make innovation policies more 
inclusive and thus both the capacities and the gains of innovation could be more effectively developed. However, this can 
only be achieved through closer cooperation and interactions between the scientific community and those actively involved 
in different stages of policy making processes. This would be even more beneficial in the eve of digitalisation, automation 
and robotisation when the new technologies are near to being fully integrated into diverse economic activities, if we are to 
minimise the social risks and maximise the economic gains associated with the 4th industrial revolution.
Keywords: EU innovation policies, SMEs, inclusion
Az elmúlt évtizedekben az innováció, a társadalmi és gazdasági fejlődés elsődleges motorjaként közkedvelt témája volt nem 
csak a tudományos közösségnek, de a politikusoknak is. Az innovációt övező érdeklődés és az ösztönzésére irányuló szá-
mottevő politikai akarat ellenére az adatok azt mutatják, hogy az EU innovációs teljesítménye nem sokat javult az utóbbi 15 
évben. A szerzők tanulmányukban arra vállalkoznak, hogy közelebbről is szemügyre veszik az 1995 és 2014 között született 
legfontosabb dokumentumokat, amelyek meghatározták az EU innovációs politikáját és ezek alapján rekonstruálják az EU 
innovációs politikájának fejlődését, majd összevetik ezt azzal a fejlődési pályával, amelyet az innovációról szóló szakirodalom 
befutott. Az innovációról szóló politikai és szakmai diskurzus összehasonlítása arra az eredményre vezetett, hogy amiképp 
az EU jelentős lemaradásban van legfontosabb versenytársaihoz képest az innováció területén, az innovációs politika hasonló 
távolságból követi az innovációs szakirodalom változásait. Ez a politikai tudásdeficit pedig jelentős akadálya annak, hogy 
kihasználjuk az innováció kínálta társadalmi és gazdasági előnyöket. Tanulmányukban amellett érvelnek, hogy az innováció 
tágabb megközelítésére alapozott innovációs politika jelentős mértékben hozzájárulhat ahhoz, hogy inkluzív módon haszno-
sítani lehessen az innovációban rejlő lehetőségeket. Ehhez azonban az eddigieknél szorosabb együttműködésre van szükség 
a tudományos közösség tagjai és a politikaformálásban érintett szakértők között. Mindez még fontosabb lenne a digitali-
záció, az automatizáció és a robotizáció hajnalán, amikor az új technológiák a hagyományos gazdasági tevékenységeket is 
egyre inkább átformálják, egyszerre kínálva jelentős társadalmi és gazdasági kockázatokat és hasznokat.
Kulcsszavak: EU innovációs politikák, kis- és középvállalkozások, befogadás
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WHEN WILL ALPHA AND OMEGA COLLIDE?  
IN SEARCH OF THE THEORETICAL RELEVANCE OF EU INNOVATION POLICIES
MIKOR ÉR (VÉGRE) ÖSSZE AZ ALPHA ÉS AZ OMEGA?  
KUTATÁS AZ EU INNOVÁCIÓS POLITIKÁINAK ELMÉLETI KERETEIBEN
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Innovation has become a core issue over the past few de-cades, and especially since 2010, with the new European 
development strategy called Europe 2020 – A strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (hereinafter Europe 
2020). However, despite the rather ambitious initiatives ai-
med to reduce the gap in innovation performance between 
the EU and its main competitors, that is the USA and Japan, 
we are witnessing relatively slow development in this field. 
One of the reasons for that is enduring differences between 
the innovation performance of large firms and small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs). For example, the Community 
Innovation Survey collects data on the share of innovative 
enterprises by the size category of the firms. While the firms 
with a smaller number of employees tend to be less innovati-
ve in all European countries, there are significant differences 
in the gap between the ratio of large and small, as well as lar-
ge and medium-sized firms. In the next table we compare the 
innovation performance of different size categories of firms. 
The second column displays the difference between the share 
of innovative large enterprises (250 or more employees) and 
innovative small (less than 50 employees) firms (thus referred 
to as the innovative L/S ratio), the third column shows the 
similar difference between the proportion of innovative large 
enterprises and innovative medium-sized (50-249 employe-
es) firms (innovative L/M ratio).i 
As we can see from the Table 1, the differences be-
tween the innovation performance of large and small firms 
are relatively high in the case of post-socialist and Medi-
terranean countries, the size gap significantly decreases 
in the case of the most developed European countries. It 
is also worth noting that the differences are much bigger 
between the large and small firms, than between large and 
medium-sized firms.
Table 1 Size gap in innovation performance
Innovative 
L/S ratio
Innovative 
L/M ratio
Poland 3,9 1,8
Hungary 2,5 1,5
Spain 2,4 1,4
Czech Republic 2,2 1,3
Slovakia 1,9 1,4
Italy 1,9 1,2
EU-28 1,7 1,3
Portugal 1,7 1,3
Austria 1,7 1,2
France 1,6 1,2
Finland 1,5 1,2
Germany 1,5 1,2
Ireland 1,5 1,2
United Kingdom 1,2 1,1
Source: Eurostat – Community Innovation Survey, 2014
Our study examines whether or not current innova-
tion policy at European level is apt to boost the innovation 
performance of the SME sector and to reduce the above-
mentioned size-gap. The paper is structured as follows. In 
the first section we will shortly outline a theoretical frame-
work in which we will analyse and evaluate the develop-
ment of European innovation policies. This is followed by 
an overview of the most important phases of EU innova-
tion policy development: the Green paper on innovation 
(1995), the Lisbon strategy (2000-2010) and the Europe 
2020 strategy (2010-2020). In the third and final section, 
we will summarise the main findings and draw some con-
clusions.
Theoretical framework of innovation policy 
analysis: narrow vs. broad approach of innovation
The origin of modern innovation studies dates back to 
the 1950s when it was called ‘science policy research’ (Mar-
tin, 2016). This heritage has a long-standing impact on how 
innovation is perceived today by the actors involved in the 
innovation policy formulation process. There are two main 
approaches of innovation policies. In the more traditional (i.e. 
narrow) policy approach, innovation is regarded as a linear 
process, where the source of all innovation activity is scien-
tific research. The results of scientific basic research trans-
formed into engineering and manufacturing, while the new 
product is distributed through marketing and sales activities. 
The directions in the process are unilateral, there are no feed-
back mechanisms included in this system. An implicit conse-
quence of this approach is that innovation is mainly regarded 
as a radically new product or process, and incremental inno-
vations are seen as of secondary importance. 
It is also worth noting that this traditional approach places 
particular emphasis on the emergence of new ideas, while 
their wider exploitation and diffusion remains a relatively ne-
glected aspect of innovation. In this narrow approach, inno-
vation is very technological in its nature and thus the primary 
manifestation is in the manufacturing sector. This approach 
also focuses specially on the generation of explicit knowl-
edge. Policies therefore aim to improve both the quantitative 
and the qualitative aspects of the higher education system 
(e.g. by raising the number of PhD students) and the research 
base of the country. All these characteristics of the narrow/
traditional approach denote the main rationale of state inter-
vention in the field of innovation (Fagerberg, 2014, p. 5). It is 
embedded in the neo-classical stream of the economic litera-
ture in which self-regulated markets would create the optimal 
resource allocation. According to this argument, innovation 
has ‘public good’ properties inhibiting firms to invest as much 
in innovation as the ‘optimum level’ would require because 
the returns from innovation investments cannot be fully ap-
propriate, as new ideas and solutions are diffused throughout 
society and the economy after some time has passed. This is 
the so-called market failure argument (Fagerberg, 2014, p. 5).
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Schienstock and Hamalainen (2001) gave an essential 
critique of the narrow (traditional) approach by underlining 
its implicit assumptions as follows: innovation is understood 
in the narrow approach as an exceptional event; innovation 
and the process of knowledge creation is seen as an isolated 
process; problems of uncertainty remain unsolved; R&D is 
supposed to be the main (if not the only) source of innova-
tion; and the narrow approach also neglects collaborative el-
ements of innovation (Schienstock & Hamalainen, 2001, p. 
50). There is an increasing volume of evidence that suggests 
that the linear model of innovation represents the exception 
rather than the rule. Most of the time it is hard to find any 
direct causal link between new scientific knowledge and in-
novation. Schienstock and Hamalainen (2001) contrast the 
science-based notion of innovation to the activity-based one 
which can take place anytime and anywhere. Instead of being 
a single event, innovation should be rather seen as a continu-
ous process related to the everyday practice of organisation. 
Thus, they stress the importance of incremental innovations. 
Another basic feature of innovation concerns its ambiguous 
and uncertain character. In order to cope with this inher-
ent uncertainty, this approach proposes to use the recursive 
model of innovation as opposed to the linear one (ibid., p. 51). 
In this model the triggers of innovation may vary depending 
on the given case, there are multiple actors involved in the 
process of innovation and there are ‘complicated feedback 
mechanisms and interactive relationships’ among them. As 
this model stresses the importance of the socially embedded 
character of innovation, it is implied that instead of explicit 
knowledge, the tacit dimension will be more relevant with 
trust relations and collective knowledge playing a key role.
This critique of the narrow approach of innovation policy 
is deeply rooted in the theoretical stream of national innovation 
systems which is the result of the 30-year old evolution of the 
innovation studies from the late 1950s until the late 1980s. In 
this view, each country represents a specific case with specific 
actors and institutions and with unique relationships among 
them. As Martin puts it: “The notion of a ‘national system of 
innovation’ (NSI) is one of the most important conceptual de-
velopments to emerge from I(nnovation) S(tudies). It shifted 
attention from the previous focus on individual innovation ac-
tors (e.g. firms, universities, and public research labs) to the 
links and interactions between the various actors making up 
the national innovation system” (Martin, 2016, p. 435).
National systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; 2016) 
evolve historically and seem to show path-dependent charac-
teristics, i.e. resisting capacity towards the changes in the en-
vironment. It is also implied that there are no universal policy 
solutions or instruments that can be effectively implemented 
independently from the context of the given country. The two 
models of innovations imply two different knowledge manage-
ment models as well, since they rely on two different types of 
knowledge. According to Jensen et al. (2004), the narrow ap-
proach can be characterized by the STI-mode (Science, Tech-
nology, Innovation) of knowledge management system dealing 
mostly with explicit and codified knowledge, while the broad 
approach involves tacit and ‘often highly localized’ knowledge 
where Doing, Using and Interacting, the so-called DUI-mode 
of knowledge management plays an important role (Table 2).
Table 2 The evolution of innovation studies: narrow and 
broad approach of innovation
Dimensions Narrow Approach Broad Approach
Model of innovation Linear Recursive
Dominant form of 
innovation
Radical Incremental
Technological Non-technological
Knowledge base Scientific, explicit and individual
Practical, tacit and 
collective
Mode of innovation STI-mode DUI-mode
Sector Manufacturing No focus on specific sectors
Policy implications Market failure approach System approach
Source: own compilation
The evolution of innovation as a concept in 
European innovation policies
In this section we will investigate how the concept of in-
novation has been changed in different European policy doc-
uments during the past 15-20 years. By doing so we will rely 
to a large extent on the theoretical framework briefly sum-
marised earlier. First of all, we would like to present some 
methodological limitations of this section. Public policy can 
be defined as: ‘all actions by public organizations that influ-
ence certain societal processes’ (Edquist, 2014). However, in 
this policy analysis we cannot meet these criteria, therefore 
we limit our focus to the main policy documents of the single 
public organization of the European Commission (EC). The 
EC has had so many programmes and initiatives that a ho-
listic evaluation would be impossible. Therefore, we will ex-
amine only the most important innovation policy documents 
of the three most important strategic documents of the EU, 
namely the Green Paper on Innovation (1995), the Lisbon 
Strategy (2000) and Europe 2020 (2010). Beside these, some 
additional reports and communications were produced.  Our 
main argument is that although a relatively stable consensus 
was reached within the research community about the advan-
tages of systemic or broad approach of innovation compared 
to the narrow one already during the early 1990s, the innova-
tion policy was dominated by the latter until the 2010s.
Green Paper on Innovation (1995)
The beginning was surprising. One of the very first docu-
ments aimed at determining innovation policy at the Euro-
pean level was the Green Paper on Innovation adopted in 
1995 (European Commission, 1995). The objective of the 
Green Paper was to identify key factors and policy measures 
through which innovation activity can be enhanced in the EU. 
Although the definition of innovation adopted in this strate-
gic document was quite vague: ‘the successful production, 
assimilation and exploitation of novelty in the economic and 
social spheres’, later we can find definitions for product, pro-
cess and organisational innovation (European Commission, 
1995, p. 1). The document also emphasizes the importance 
of such background factors as the innovation culture or skill 
basis of the society, as well as the contribution of the public 
service sector. As the document puts it: ‘… innovation is (…) 
the introduction of changes in management, work organisa-
tion, and the working conditions and skills of the workforce’ 
(European Commission, 1995, p. 1).
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These are clearly important elements of the broad ap-
proach. Similarly, the document recognizes that innovation 
is not a linear process but involves dense interactions of dif-
ferent actors, including the users ‘and anticipating the needs 
of the market and society are just as important – if not more 
so – than a mastery of the technology’ (European Com-
mission, 1995, p. 1). The Green Paper also distinguishes 
between radical and incremental innovation - giving equal 
importance to both kinds. Concerning the sectors involved 
in innovation activities the document also remains neutral, 
recognizing the importance of innovation not only in high-
tech sectors but also in agriculture, service, and even public 
sector innovation is underlined. Later in the document, the 
authors argue that organisational innovation plays a crucial 
role as it is frequently a necessary precondition for the suc-
cess of other forms of innovation and that Europe lags be-
hind its competitors in this field.
In relation to the theoretical framework briefly sketched 
in the previous section, the Green Paper is balancing be-
tween the broad and narrow approach of innovation. There 
is an inevitable gap between the theoretical background of 
the Green Paper and the measures proposed: although from 
a theoretical point of view, this document can be evalu-
ated as one which fully applies the broad-based approach, 
in terms of policy measures it remains technology-orient-
ed. According to the document one of the most important 
weaknesses the European Union has to face is the so-called 
European paradox. This term refers to the fact that while 
Europe performs well in terms of basic scientific research, it 
struggles in transforming its scientific excellence into com-
mercial success compared to its main competitors, i.e. to 
the US and Japan. This analysis had a long-lasting impact 
on the orientation of European innovation policies, focus-
ing mainly on patent regulation, tax incentives and stronger 
collaboration between R&D sectors and industry, strength-
ening the technology absorption capacity of SMEs, etc. 
This phenomenon can be observed in the Green Paper itself. 
This is most visible when it comes to the measures pro-
posed on the basis of the broad-based theory applied. In 
the second part of the paper, the Commission outlines a 
full set of actions that has to be taken in order to improve 
innovation capacity of both firms and individuals in the 
European Union (European Commission, 1995, pp. 38-
47). None of the listed 13 measures can be linked to non-
technological innovation but reflect a narrow approach 
especially emphasizing the importance of technological 
innovation, scientific, explicit and individual knowledge-
base, the STI mode of innovation and the manufacturing 
sector. This divide between theoretical assumptions and 
concrete policy measures can be identified in subsequent 
innovation strategies and other policy documents, too.
The Lisbon Strategy: one step forward, two step 
back towards a holistic innovation policy
The Lisbon Strategy (2000) aimed to create a model 
for a knowledge-based economy and society which is the 
most competitive and dynamic in the world. The Strat-
egy defined three strategic goals: sustainable economic 
growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. 
It was not at all surprising that in the context of knowl-
edge-based economy, innovation quickly became a core 
issue. There were two main initiatives aimed to foster in-
novation. The first was the establishment of the European 
Area of Research and Innovation, the second aimed to 
create friendly environment for start-ups and SMEs. As 
part of this initiative, the Commission aimed to increase 
the competitiveness and dynamism of the business sector 
by creating a friendlier environment especially for start-
ups and SME-s. This involved lowering the costs and the 
administrative burdens of doing business. Encouraging 
interfaces between the partners of the Triple Helix models 
and advisory services and other types of business angels 
also became a priority in the policy agenda. It is important 
to note that this was the first time in the history of the EU’s 
innovation policy when innovation activity of the SMEs 
had been given top priority.
However, in these key policy documents one can 
hardly find any traces of broad-based innovation. In fact, 
the only quantifiable innovation-related objective of the 
Strategy was to increase the share of R&D expenditures 
in GDP from 1.9% to 3% by 2010 and to raise the pro-
portion of private investments within these expenditures 
from 55% up to 67%. The implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy has been achieved in three main phases. This 
first period is also known as Lisbon I and took place be-
tween 2000 and 2004. This was followed by a mid-term 
review and a second period of the Strategy 2005-2008, 
also known as Lisbon II. The third phase was the continu-
ation of Lisbon II in the context of global financial crisis 
and economic downturn. The mid-term review resulted in 
a slightly modified innovation strategy ‘European Partner-
ship for Growth and Jobs’ and in an Action Plan ‘More 
Research and Innovation – a Common Approach’. The 
analysis of these documents together with other key policy 
documents shows that the broad approach has never been 
fully applied during this period of time. It is especially 
true for the action plans, more concrete policy measures 
and evaluation methods.
A good example for this contradiction at different poli-
cy levels can be found from 2003 when the European Com-
mission issued a communication on updating the concept 
of innovation (EC, 2003a) and also an action plan (EC, 
2003b). Both documents were approved in 2003. The first 
one represents a theoretical shift from linear to a systemic 
model of innovation though keeping the strategic aim of 
raising the share of R&D expenditure to 3% of the GDP: 
‘Important though research is as the source of invention, 
innovation encompasses more than the successful applica-
tion of research results. The evolution of the innovation 
concept – from the linear model having R&D as the start-
ing point to the systemic model in which innovation arises 
from complex interactions between individuals, organi-
sations and their operating environment – demonstrates 
that innovation policies must extend their focus beyond 
the link with research’ (EC, 2003a, p. 4). Beside the R&D-
based linear approach, the document also recognises the 
importance of incremental innovations, the so-called val-
ue-innovation, organisational and business model innova-
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tion and design and marketing innovation. The document 
criticizes the innovation policies of the past: ‘Although it 
is the systemic model that now dominates in policy dis-
cussions, many measures put into practice with the inten-
tion to promote innovation still appear to owe more to 
the linear view’ (EC, 2003a, p. 7). This broadening of the 
innovation approach involves a shift in the focus of the 
innovation policy as well as recognising that enterprises 
are at the heart of the innovation process. Therefore, the 
most important target of the innovation policy should be 
the enterprises, their behaviour, capacities and environ-
ment. In parallel with this shift, statistical data analysis 
also has to be reviewed as well: ‘These models also colour 
measurements of the innovation process and innovation 
performance, which are usually biased towards indicators 
of technological innovation’ (EC, 2003a, p. 7).
While the developed policy document explored the 
new broad-based approach of innovation, the Commission 
issued an innovation action plan three months later in the 
same year which reflected rather few elements from the 
renewed concept of innovation elaborated a few months 
earlier. The only focus of the action plan was to design 
policy initiatives which can effectively help to increase the 
average research investment level from 1.9% of GDP to 
3% of GDP by 2010, of which 2/3 should be funded by the 
private sector. As it has been argued earlier, this objective, 
that has never been achieved, would require at that time 
an annual growth rate of 6% in the public sector and 9% 
annual growth in the private investments. Initiatives, on 
the other hand, aimed to boost organisational or other non-
technological innovation are completely missing from the 
action plan. Concerning the measurement, we can see the 
dominance of indicators reflecting the narrow approach of 
innovation throughout the Lisbon process. In March 2000 
the European Council approved a set of structural indica-
tors. Among these only the following ones were aimed to 
measure innovation to a very narrow extent: public expen-
diture on education, the total R&D expenditure, the level 
of Internet access, the number of science and technology 
graduates, the patenting activities, venture capital invest-
ments and ICT expenditure.
Europe 2020: significant changes in European 
Innovation policy
In the new European strategy called Europe 2020 – A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, in-
novation remained an important issue and became one 
of the seven flagship initiatives. The aim was to adopt a 
much more strategic approach to innovation: ‘An approach 
whereby innovation is the overarching policy objective’ 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 2). The so-called Inno-
vation Union initiative is built around 34 specific com-
mitments in five main thematic areas: strengthening the 
knowledge base and reducing fragmentation, getting good 
ideas to market, maximising social and territorial cohe-
sion, pooling forces to achieve breakthroughs: European 
Innovation Partnerships, and leveraging policies external-
ly. We can see two major steps towards the broad-based 
approach of innovation: the emergence of social aims as 
an outcome of innovation activities and the importance of 
policy learning with self-reflection and different feedback 
mechanisms, implicitly assuming some sort of social dia-
logue in this field.
Instead of presenting all 34 commitments we will only 
outline the most important points of the strategy. One of 
the primary aims of the strategy is to increase the R&D&I 
investments to 3% as a share of GDP in all Member States. 
This remains an important threshold to reach despite the fi-
nancial and economic crisis. Fast growing SMEs are one of 
the most important target groups of these initiatives of eas-
ing access to finance, making intellectual property rights 
more affordable to enterprises and setting interoperable 
standards. In order to tackle societal challenges more ef-
fectively, the strategy launched a special programme called 
the European Innovation Partnership. The main societal 
challenges identified by the strategy are among others: life-
threatening diseases, new solutions to improve the lives of 
elder people, ways to radically cut CO2 emissions, alterna-
tive sources of energy, reducing and recycling waste, smart 
transport, healthy or high-quality food stuffs, communica-
tion and interfacing (European Commission, 2010, p. 22). 
The Commission monitors the innovation performance of 
the Member States through the Innovation Union Scoreboard 
(IUS) and through the Summary Innovation Index (SII). The 
Scoreboard was first created in 2002 and has been revised 
several times since then. The SII is a composite indicator of 
25 sub-indicators. Since this is the primary monitoring tool 
of the EC which is reflective of the EU’s innovation policy 
approach and influencing it at the same time, it is essential 
to thoroughly analyse it. In a recent research paper, Havas et 
al. (2015) revealed a strong bias towards R&D-based innova-
tions, that is, towards the narrow approach of innovation poli-
cies. As they argue, among the 25 indicators: ‘10 indicators 
are only relevant for, and a further four mainly capture, R&D-
based innovations; seven could be relevant for both types of 
innovations; and a mere four focus on non-R&D-based in-
novations. Given that (i) the IUS is used by the European 
Commission to monitor progress, and (ii) its likely impact on 
national policy-makers, this bias towards R&D-based inno-
vation is a source of major concern’ (Havas et al., 2015, p. 18). 
The only other instrument to measure innovation activities of 
the firms is the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) carried 
out every second year.
According to the first evaluations of the Europe 2020 
strategy, further improvements are needed in eliminating in-
consistencies in rules and practices making innovation activ-
ity less burdensome and risky, especially by creating a real 
European single market. Another gap identified is the weak 
innovation culture which could be only improved by a closer 
involvement of society. Although major achievements have 
been reached concerning public sector innovation, signifi-
cant reserves remained unused in this field. The strategy puts 
a special emphasis on promoting the inclusive character of 
innovation, that is on equal access to both development ca-
pacities and the benefits of innovation, further steps need to 
be taken in order to strengthen this inclusive dimension. The 
evaluation also identifies considerable skills shortage and 
mismatches: ‘It does not only concern sector-specific skills, 
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but also numeracy and literacy skills, as well as the ‘21st cen-
tury skills’ for creativity and entrepreneurial spirit’ (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014, p. 11). From the perspectives of this 
paper, the most important elements are the recognition of the 
inclusive character of innovation and the necessity of the de-
velopment of generic skills instead of industry-specific ones.
It is also worth noting that since the beginning of the 
launch of Innovation Union Initiatives (2010), important 
policy priorities have been defined. Among the top six pri-
ority areas we can find social innovation, design-driven 
innovation, demand-side innovation policies, public sector 
innovation, public procurement of innovation and work-
place innovation. Overall, we can say that the European 
innovation strategy represents a significant shift from 
the narrow to the broad approach of innovation policy al-
though it is far from its full application and can be placed 
somewhere midway between the two. The essence of the 
evolution of the European innovation policies is sum-
marised in the Table 3.
Conclusions and implications
A remarkable shift in the evolution of the EU’s inno-
vation policy was found from the narrow to broad-based 
approach when it comes to its theoretical basis. This is, 
however, only true with two restrictions. First, there is 
a considerable gap between the theoretical foundations 
of innovation policies and their policy measures. As we 
could see from the Green Paper on Innovation (1995), at 
a theoretical level, innovation policies have been open 
to a broad-based, systemic or holistic approach from as 
early as the mid-90s. On the other hand, this is hardly 
reflected in action plans and on a policy measure level 
in general: the measures seem to be derived from the 
narrow approach to innovation where state intervention 
is justified by market failures and which is character-
ised by the linear model of innovation focusing on radi-
cal and technological innovation of the manufacturing 
sector on the basis of scientific, explicit and individual 
knowledge. 
Table 3 The evolution of EU innovation policies 1995-2015
Green Paper (1995) Lisbon I (2000-2005) Lisbon II (2005-2008) Lisbon III (2008-2010) Europe 2020
Elements of 
broad-based 
innovation 
concept
Fully applied broad-
based approach
A slight shift from 
a linear towards a 
systemic approach 
appears only in 2003 
Public procurement 
as a tool to boost 
innovation
No significant changes 
compared to Lisbon II
Top 6 priorities: social 
innovation; design-driven 
innovation; demand-side 
innovation policies; public 
sector innovation; public 
procurement of innovation; 
workplace innovation
Elements of 
narrow innovation 
concept
In terms of proposed 
policy measures, it 
remains technology-
oriented: importance 
of technological 
innovation, scientific, 
explicit and individual 
knowledge-base, the 
STI mode of innovation
Strategic objective is 
to raise the share of 
R&D expenditures in 
the GDP from 1.9% to 
3% by 2010
Focus is on R&D 
expenditures, green 
economy, strong 
industrial base and on 
innovation-friendly 
environment, explicit 
reference to market 
failure approach
Increase investment in 
R&D, innovation and 
education.
Develop clean 
technologies for cars 
and construction.
High-speed internet 
for all
Innovation statistics 
remain science and 
technology-focused
Measurement Establishment of the European Innovation Scoreboard: no indicators of non-technological innovation and Job Quality
5 key indicators and the 
creation of Innovation 
Union Scoreboard and 
Summary Innovation Index
Sector prioritised
Innovation is important 
in low-tech sectors, 
in private and public 
segments of services
No sectoral focus Promotes innovation in the services
Green economy, car 
manufacturing and 
constructions
Health and social service, 
green economy, public 
sector
Interrelation of 
Innovation and 
Job Quality
Recognised but 
poorly developed, 
more focus put on 
quantitative dimension 
of employment
Exclusive focus 
on quantitative 
dimension of 
employment, although 
improving working 
conditions becomes a 
strategic objective
‘Better jobs’ dropped from the agenda
Job quality is of high 
priority again, though 
not in direct relation to 
innovation
Social inclusion Does not appear
Special emphasis on 
promoting the inclusive 
character of innovation.
Though this shift does not appear in concrete policy measures and action plans and remains mainly rhetoric: ‘enterprises are at the heart of the innova-
tion process’.
Contribution of innovative-related trade in manufactured goods to the balance of trade of goods; Share of fast growing and innovative firms in the 
economy; Percentage of employment in knowledge intensive activities; Patent applications weighted by GDP; Hourly labour productivity
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The weaknesses of the narrow approach are numerous 
and obvious. Concerning education, for example, which is 
an important element of all innovation policies, we did not 
find any references to the skill needs, knowledge and man-
power use practices of the enterprises and especially SMEs 
(i.e. demand side). Instead, European policies targeted almost 
exclusively the supply side of education. In the context of the 
current disruptive technological changes (like automation, 
digitisation, robotisation, etc.) the skill biased aspect of inno-
vation is worth special attention: ‘Beyond the quantitative ef-
fect of new technologies on the number of employees, it is also 
important to investigate the qualitative effect of technological 
change on different categories of workers. The basic premise 
here is that innovations are skill-biased and, therefore, replace 
tasks traditionally carried out by unskilled workers with new 
jobs demanding skilled workers’ (Vivarelli, 2014, p. 138).
The market failure argument is about the justification 
of state intervention. According to the argument rooted 
in traditional neoclassical economics such an intervention 
can only be justified in the case of market failure, i.e. when 
markets are unable to produce optimum functioning. Mar-
ket failures may have various sources: economies of scale 
and scope, asymmetric information, externalities, etcii. 
As Edquist (2014) rightly argued: ‘the notion of optimal-
ity is irrelevant in the field of innovations and innovation 
systems’ (p. 15). The design of innovation policies should 
not follow universal objectives (such as the share of R&D 
expenditures in GDP) but has to be based on the analysis 
of the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of the in-
dividual national innovation systems. In relation to this, 
it is necessary to stress the differences in the countries’ 
historical and institutional contexts. This institutional va-
riety plays an important filtering role between such mega-
trends as globalization, networking of economy and so-
ciety, ICT, outsourcing of business functions etc. On the 
basis of these concluding remarks, we can formulate some 
general propositions for a future innovation policy:
1) Separate research policy from innovation policy. This is 
the heritage of the traditional linear view of innovation 
inhibiting the shift towards a holistic policy approach. 
2) Another important element which may facilitate such 
a shift in policy orientation would be the development 
of a measurement tool better at capturing the complex 
character of innovation processes. 
3) Innovation policies should be more open to low-tech 
sectors and put less focus on high-tech. The case of 
Denmark and Austria are the examples of highly in-
novative countries with low-tech industrial structure. 
In addition, low and medium-low sectors represent 
important segments of the economies where the domi-
nant form of innovation is incremental innovation.
4) A similar shift in the focus is needed from large to small 
and medium-sized enterprises because this sector is an 
important locus of employment and economic perfor-
mance in every country.
5) The shift towards a broad approach also involves chang-
es in innovation governance where processes of policy 
design and policy learning are of essential importance.
We would refrain from proposing a set of more concrete 
actions because an appropriate innovation policy takes into 
account the specificities of different national innovation sys-
tems and there are no universally applicable political solu-
tions. There exists, however, numerous national level initia-
tives that can serve as an example for measures based on a 
holistic innovation approach such as the Swedish functional 
public procurement system (Edquist, 2018) or the Finnish 
workplace development programme (Alasoini, 2015). The 
Swedish functional public procurement system is a good ex-
ample for how to increase the demand for innovation, whilst 
the Finnish programme is aimed to enhance the learning net-
works consisting of enterprises, universities, research insti-
tutes and other stakeholders at a local level.
Although we examined primarily the evolution of the 
EU’s innovation policy in this paper, it is also worth noting 
that the main locus of innovation-related public actions and 
measures can be found at a national level. The EU innova-
tion policy is important in this regard as a general frame-
work which orientates national innovation policies to a dif-
ferent extent. There is some inherent contradiction between 
a single EU innovation policy and the real needs of different 
Member States having their own historical developments 
and path dependent national innovation systems. What is 
important here, therefore, is the existing policy learning 
processes and mechanisms enhanced basically by a more or 
less intensive dialogue between the stakeholders involved. 
It is only through this dialogue that a compromise can be 
reached between the feasibility of scientifically desirable 
and the politically administrative policy actions.
These conclusions derived from an analysis of the de-
velopment of the European innovation policy are especially 
relevant in the Hungarian context. According to the results of 
the latest issue of the European Innovation Scoreboard the in-
dicators indicating the most significant lagging compared to 
the European average can be found in the SME sector. Hun-
gary is a moderate innovator, its overall innovation perfor-
mance is 66% of the European average, the three indicators 
reflecting the innovation performance of the SME sector vary 
between 13.7-16% of the EU-average (European Union, 2018, 
p. 66). It is clear from this analysis that it will be extremely 
difficult and costly to narrow the gap between the European 
and the Hungarian SME-sector’s innovation performance, if 
the Hungarian innovation remains in the old paradigm of the 
narrow approach of innovation as SMEs generally lack the 
necessary human, financial and technological resources to 
run R&D projects and the majority of them operates outside 
of the manufacturing sector. Therefore, the redesign of Hun-
garian and European innovation policies is a major challenge 
ahead of us and must represent a top priority for all stakehold-
ers of the national innovation system. 
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Endnotes 
i  For example, in the first case we divided the proportion 
of innovative large enterprises from all large enterpri-
ses by the proportion of innovative small firms from 
all small firms, and so on. The table shows that the 
proportion of innovative large enterprises is 3.9 times 
higher than the innovative small firms in Poland.
ii  For a literature review, see: BIS, 2010.
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